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Bearing Witness to Atrocity Crimes: Photography & International Law∗ 
 
‘Let the atrocious images haunt us. Even if they are only tokens, and cannot 
possibly encompass most of the reality to which they refer, they still 
perform a vital function. The images say: This is what human beings are 
capable of doing-may volunteer to do, enthusiastically, selfrighteously. 
Don't forget.’i 
 
Abstract 
 
This article uses ideas propounded by Susan Sontag and Judith Butler on 
photography to illuminate the signiﬁcant role of photography and visual media 
in international law jurisprudence. Two key questions are pursued: ﬁrstly, what 
role does photography have in international law (with a particular focus on 
abusive photography), and, secondly, how do photography and visual media bear 
witness to atrocity crimes in international law? The article commences with an 
overview of the evolution of war photography as it dovetails the inclusion of 
visual media in juridical settings, and interrogates ethical issues involved in the 
aestheticization of suﬀering for consumerist purposes. Drawing from scholarly 
deﬁnitions of atrocity crimes, the article settles on terminology which carves out 
the parameters of the socio-legal research space. In identifying the relevant areas 
of international law, the study reads the associated jurisprudence with a 
theoretical lens, evincing the critical evidentiary role that photography plays in 
the litigation of the most serious international crimes, such as genocide, war 
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crimes, and crimes against humanity. Tension between the transitive and 
probative functions of visual evidence is examined through a rich tapestry of 
international jurisprudence.   
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In her seminal work, On Photography, Susan Sontag explores the unique 
contribution of photography to the world, concluding that it introduced a new 
visual code which expands ‘our notions of what is worth looking at and what we 
have a right to observe.’ii To photograph means to ‘appropriate the thing 
photographed,’ and to put ‘oneself into a certain relation to the world that feels 
like knowledge-and, therefore, like power.’iii Tension exists between a view of 
photography as depicting primarily a world of fact where experience is mediated 
in a raw, direct and unpolluted manner, against the idea that whilst ‘visual 
images can be a window into other people’s lives, it is not necessarily a 
transparent window.’iv The advent of photography had profound socio-legal 
consequences in chronicling events, by both interrupting and expanding 
temporality through its objects. The power to shape and interpret history was 
recognised by one of its earliest proponents, who reportedly said that ‘the 
camera is the eye of history.’v  
Parallel to the rise of the daguerreotype and its employment on the field of 
battle was the ascendency of ideological realism, which required the showing of 
unpleasant and hard facts.vi That is to say, capturing life in its depictions, along 
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with claims to mechanical objectivity, contributed to photography’s ‘special 
power of persuasion.’vii Taken into a legal context, photography provides 
evidence about something we might doubt, which ‘seems proven when we're 
shown a photograph of it.’viii Jennifer Mnookin outlines how photography and 
various forms of ‘machine produced visual images,’ rapidly assumed a central 
evidentiary role in American civil and criminal trials in the latter half of 19th 
century.ix Photography’s relevance to international law gained traction in the 
20th century, underpinned by advancements in technology, the development of 
war photography as a profession, as well as evolving norms and standards 
internationally. This article queries how photography and visual media bear 
witness to atrocity crimes, and the manner in which the resulting records are 
incorporated as evidence before international courts and tribunals. Several 
issues, definitional, ethical, and philosophical, are explored before an in-depth 
discussion of the circumstances that contextualize the visual field - photography 
and video recordings captured by a range of image producing devices, from 
traditional cameras to modern smartphones that document the most serious 
international crimes. Lastly, the article explores the visual documentary hub of 
the evidentiary matrix incorporated into international legal jurisprudence in 
practice.   
Photographing atrocity was established in the 19th century by Roger 
Fenton’s daguerreotypes of post-battle theatres in the Crimean War. Matthew 
Brady’s pictures of fallen soldiers during the American Civil War were made 
possible because the ‘dead struck the most cooperative poses.’x Superseded by 
lighter cameras with faster films that were transportable to theatres of war and 
capable of capturing action, war photography was firmly established by World 
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War II.xi According to Sontag, the modern phenomenon of being ‘a spectator of 
calamities taking place in another country’ is driven by consumerist demands 
and thus the medium of photography allows customers to become reality 
tourists to the entire world made available ‘as an object of appraisal.’xii Images of 
Nazi concentration camps at liberation, including an official documentary report 
filmed by the US Army Lieutenant Colonel George E. Stevens, ushered in a ‘new, 
and at the time unknown, terrain of violation and horror.’xiii Essentially what 
Stevens and photojournalists such as Margaret Bourke-White and George Rodger 
depicted was the unrepresentable - crimes that SS guards informed camp 
inhabitants the world would not believe.xiv  
Theodor Adorno was highly sceptical of what he viewed as the post-
Holocaust culture of aestheticizing human suffering to a point of banality.xv In 
Adorno’s view, the aesthetic style principle removes something of the horror 
these photographs portray, and the artistic rendering leaves the possibility that 
some pleasure may be derived from future viewings.xvi Adorno inadvertently 
alludes to the different contextual apprehensions of photographs, and his 
exploration of the relationship between aesthetics and representing human 
suffering is perspicacious because it points to a critical dimension of this debate, 
which is how we represent and react to atrocity that is beyond language?xvii Does 
communicating suffering through visual media lead to ‘the normalization of 
atrocity’?xviii David Campbell identifies a growing gap or chasm between what is 
depicted and our moral responsiveness to such representations.xix However, it is 
submitted that Sontag’s entreaty, ‘let the atrocious images haunt us,’ can be 
applied to international law jurisprudence, and human rights activism to a lesser 
extent.xx 
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The polysemic nature of photography helps to challenge the notion that 
photographs lose their capacity to shock; in this view, photographs carry ‘a 
variety of potential meanings.’xxi As ‘artefacts of history,’ images may open up 
alternative ‘historical and ethical paradigms’ antithetical to the oppressive 
cultures in which they were produced.xxii Of course, this argument could sustain 
the shifting contextualization of photography for less innocuous purposes, such 
as the historical revisionism of atrocity.xxiii However, from a legal evidentiary 
standpoint, it is possible to test visual evidence within and against the wider 
body of evidence that re-constructs an event.xxiv Whilst visual evidence may not 
be essential to legal claims, as a ‘future-oriented medium that resists oblivion’ it 
is extremely useful; the potential probative value of the image can trigger a 
particular legal response and contribute to a juridical determination that a 
violation occurred.’xxv 
Piyel Haldar observes that evidence links the court of law ‘to the outside 
world, an internal world of codes to an the external world of chaos, where an 
event as violation has occurred.’xxvi Visual evidence, such as photography, is 
regarded as sui generis and free of the inherent unreliability of verbal 
communication (hearsay). This is because the objective truth may be clinically 
recorded in an authentic manner by the camera, ‘the perfect instrument of 
evidence, the evidencer's tool, an unimpeachable source of information,’ and as 
the camera’s statement, the photograph is a ‘perfect trace; an imprint or a 
transfer of the real.’xxvii Haldar evokes a theory of evidence, whereby the visual 
(the sign) is associated with a pre-photographic referential event that is the basis 
of evidentiary representation.xxviii The photographic framing involving a ‘division 
between inside and outside’ is reflected in the legal framing and is critical to the 
 6
jurisprudential evidentiary matrix. xxix  Since evidence is concerned with 
‘guarantees of authenticity’ in the performance of law, such guarantees are 
essentially ‘visual or oral in their perceptual form, and are privileged over the 
written, scriptural forms of communication.’xxx 
Sontag argues that today the notion of war crime or atrocity ‘is associated 
with the expectation of photographic evidence.’xxxi Judith Butler explores the idea 
that contemporary understandings of atrocity require photographic evidence.xxxii 
Undoubtedly, in this age, public awareness about human rights issues can 
depend on the availability of visual evidence.xxxiii The juridical opportunities 
presented by visual evidence is undeniable, but the absence of such evidence 
may also indicate crimes shielded by censorship and subterfuge. Incorporating 
visual evidence of atrocity crimes at international level first occurred during the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials following World War II. The International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East found that the Japanese government’s suppression of 
images and the absence of photographs depicting the ill-treatment of prisoners 
of war actually testified to the government’s complicity in these crimes and the 
Tribunal pinpointed several relevant censorship regulations as well as end of 
war directives regarding the destruction of inculpatory documents.xxxiv Indeed, a 
further visual anomie rests at the heart of the Tokyo judgment; not because of a 
lack of visual signifiers, but because the narrative regarding the Allied crimes of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was linked to the post-war power to determine the legal 
framework of accountability.xxxv Thus, certain visual evidence was admitted as 
the statute allowed, whilst other evidence of atrocity crimes was ignored. 
At Nuremberg, twenty-two Nazi defendants were prosecuted for 
international crimes, such as initiating a war of aggression, war crimes, and 
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crimes against humanity, the latter charge indicating that for the first time 
international criminal responsibility transcended domestic legal frameworks for 
‘atrocities committed by a government against its own people.’xxxvi Similar to the 
way the Tokyo Tribunal  prosecuted only Japanese crimes, the jurisprudential 
corpus focused solely on Nazi crimes, and the Court’s gaze was averted from 
Allied crimes, such as the systematic rape of women in occupied countries by 
Russian soldiers, and the indiscriminate firebombing of German cities by Allied 
air forces.xxxvii Thus, the visual evidence submitted to the tribunal reflected this 
determinate judicial statute. Both photographic and video evidence undergirded 
the war crimes and crimes against humanity charges.xxxviii Two films were 
screened during the trial, including Lieutenant Colonel Stevens’ hour-long film 
montage of scenes in several concentration camps at liberation titled ‘Nazi 
Concentration Camps.’xxxix Lawrence Douglas highlights two key points with 
respect to this screening; firstly, that it was unprecedented in a juridical setting, 
and that ‘prior to Nuremberg one can find no records of any court using graphic 
film of atrocities as proof of criminal wrongdoing.’xl Secondly, the film was 
admitted through relaxed rules of evidence, not requiring in court corroboration, 
which would have been excluded as hearsay in the normal course of events.xli 
Anglo-American legal convention precludes visual evidence deemed so 
gruesome that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that 
a jury would be unfairly prejudiced.xlii These doctrines were swept aside by a 
charter that adopted to the greatest extent possible ‘expeditious and non-
technical procedure,’ admitting any evidence which it deemed ‘to have probative 
value.’xliii Thus, a novel visual record temporally distant from the alluded crimes, 
characterised by the absence of Nazi perpetrators and their collaborators, was 
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shown, not because of its evidentiary value, but because of its transitive or 
affective function.xliv The focus of those present was split between the ‘extremity 
of the atrocity captured on screen,’ and the affective reaction of the defendants in 
court, but the screening contributed very little to a determination of their 
individual guilt.xlv It was necessary because these were unprecedented atrocities 
and the visual evidence contextualised crimes that did not fit into conventional 
notions of wrongdoing.xlvi The momentum behind prosecuting those responsible 
for international atrocity crimes stagnated with the Cold War, but was revived 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.xlvii  
Larry Gross, John Stuart Katz and Jay Ruby, note that in recent decades ‘the 
world of mediated images has undergone transformations that have profound 
implications for the moral and ethical, as well as the legal and professional, 
dimensions of image-producing practices.’xlviii Most significant has been the 
emergence of widely accessible digital imaging technologies, which can be 
rapidly disseminated online in an unfiltered manner.xlix  New media technologies 
becoming ‘ubiquitous in war zones’ indicates a paradigm shift, whereby the 
professional war photographer or embedded reporter has been supplanted or 
supplemented by soldiers using mobile phones and digital cameras to capture 
images from the banal to the atrocious that are then shared with friends, military 
colleagues, family members and ‘wider global audiences on the Internet.’l In 
some instances, new ‘technologies of witnessing’li allow perpetrators to ‘enjoy 
the reflection of their actions on the digital camera, and disseminate that 
particular accomplishment quickly, as digital technology allows.’lii Building on 
acts of torture, this abusive photography is also described by Butler as the 
‘digitalization of evil.’liii All kinds of photography produce an ‘equivocation at the 
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level of the temporality of the event,’ but this is heightened with the 
instantaneous dissemination capacities of the novel witness.liv In other words, 
photography is a ‘kind of promise that the event will continue,’ and therefore not 
strictly anterior or posterior to the event.lv Whilst the indefinite temporality of 
photography may be exploited by individuals or institutions as a mode of control 
or abuse, the resulting image may equally be utilised as a mode of resistance, 
exposing crimes and contributing to documentary evidence of violations.lvi  
 
II. Understanding the Visual 
 
Sontag maintains that accompanying captions help us to interpret the image. For 
Butler, the act of framing the photograph is itself an interpretive act - images are 
framed for a purpose, which is carried within and through the frame.lvii By this 
view, every photograph ‘in framing reality, is already interpreting what will 
count within the frame; this act of delimitation is surely interpretive, as are the 
effects of angle, focus, and light.’lviii Butler uses the notion of framing to show 
how social and ethical norms enter the visual field. These norms, which should 
not be confused with legal norms, ‘govern when and where a life counts as 
human’ and therefore ‘when and where such a life is grievable.’ lix These broader 
socio-political norms operate in many ways, such as through ‘frames that govern 
the perceptible,’ and essentially bring the image into focus ‘on the condition that 
some portion of the visual field is ruled out.’lx Butler regards the frame as 
actively producing the field of representation, both by what is included and, 
significantly, by what is excluded from the frame. Ethical considerations 
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intersect with visual controls resulting in epistemological intelligibility, creating 
‘conditions for the inclusion and exclusion of human beings.’lxi Ontological norms 
are sublimated in discursive and visual fields that tend to either ‘orchestrate or 
foreclose ethical responsiveness to suffering.’lxii Fundamentally, this means that 
certain norms impact the field of visual representation - whose life may be 
memorialised through seeing and whose life ‘may leave no trace to grieve.’lxiii  
Scholarly debate focuses on the political forces that mediate the 
interpretation and reception of images, with Mladjo Ivanovic discussing the 
topologies of power that influence which cases of suffering can be shown to 
western audiences.lxiv Sontag also explores the factors that shape our attention to 
global catastrophes and the evaluations attached to these crises.lxv One good 
example of the frame being overdetermined or pre-determined is the situation of 
embedded reporting. Butler maintains that the performative power of the state 
is facilitated by embedded journalists and photographers who carry out its 
‘forcible dramaturgy,’ therefore validating a reality or perspective sanctioned by 
government. The mandated photographs structure the cognitive apprehension of 
war, or to put it another way, ‘the reach and extent of the visual field.’lxvi Certain 
attributes that would pre-dispose a photographer to accept an ‘interpretation of 
the war compelled by the state,’ become embedded in the visual frame.lxvii Yet, 
the idea that socio-political values shape the visual field presents particularistic 
legal difficulties, especially when set against claims concerning the universality 
of human rights and customary law norms.lxviii  
It is important not to conclude that exclusion from the frame signifies not 
being counted, not being grieved, or not having one’s victimhood acknowledged, 
because there are counter-examples to be found in international jurisprudence. 
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Photography was absolutely prohibited in Nazi concentration camps; the vast 
majority of people perished in the absence of any visual record testifying to their 
journey through the camps. lxix Yet the murder of ‘approximately six million Jews’ 
was retrospectively acknowledged in the judgment at Nuremberg.lxx Although on 
a much smaller scale, several convictions were secured by the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone in the absence of photographic evidence and on the basis of 
eyewitness testimony alone.lxxi This point notwithstanding, legal opportunities to 
litigate atrocity crimes may be improved by the visual, and in such contexts the 
image may be re-interpreted, unmasking juridically significant aspects of the 
initial framing and exclusion. Photographs can ‘turn against’ their socio-political 
and military cultural genesis. When the visual landscape exposes a reality at 
odds with the official framing of events, whistle-blowers and leaks provide 
information essential for public dissemination and evidence of probative value to 
international courts and tribunals. Further ‘opportunities’ are presented by the 
digitalisation of suffering in modern warfare. Taken to its limit, the proliferation 
of visual recording devices means that anyone anywhere can capture images that 
contradict the visual field sanctioned by the state. More than just revealing the 
devastation of war, the digitalization of suffering provides evidentiary 
opportunities that easily and quickly transcend the original scene because of 
technological advancements. 
As a mode of communication, photography is ‘transitive’ because it elicits a 
response in the viewer: ‘[f]or photographs to communicate effectively, they must 
have a transitive function: they must act on viewers in ways that bear directly on 
the judgments that viewers formulate about the world.’lxxii Affectivity can alter 
political viewpoints and trigger moral responsiveness, but photographs must 
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retain their capacity to shock and ‘appeal to our sense of moral obligation.’lxxiii 
Images provoked opposition to the Vietnam War, whilst international war 
journalists and photographers drawing attention to the state of siege in Saravejo 
produced the so-called ‘CNN effect.’lxxiv Indeed, a photograph taken by Associated 
Press photographer Morten Hvaal, depicting a five-year-old girl injured by a 
mortar explosion, together with media commentary, ‘led to the first proper 
evacuation of wounded children from Sarajevo’ during the siege.lxxv While 
photographs occur within a deeper web of historical and social processes that 
affect us, Ivanovic argues that understanding these mechanisms reveals how ‘our 
subjectivity and agency are constituted through the effects of social forces that 
condition our capacity to perceive and understand.’lxxvi Moreover, the manner in 
which images of atrocity are instrumentalised may trigger ‘cognitive 
resistances.’lxxvii Thus, compassion does not necessarily translate into action, and 
‘[s]o far as we feel sympathy, we feel we are not accomplices to what caused the 
suffering. Our sympathy proclaims our innocence as well as our impotence.’lxxviii 
To fully engage a compassionate response would be to reflect or acknowledge 
that our privilege and the suffering of others occur on the same global plane.lxxix 
Behind the smokescreen of ‘quasiempathetic responses and presentations in the 
media’ lies a core ‘numb blindness,’ especially if our privilege on the map drives 
consumption of such images. lxxx  This might also explain our ‘civilised 
indifference’ to depictions of the dead, such as that of Syrian toddler Aylan Kurdi, 
delivered via social media through a ‘screen of abstraction,’ and we rapidly look 
away.lxxxi 
Consumption of human misery happening elsewhere is a quintessentially 
modern experience that signals the predicament of compassion fatigue, whereby 
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a desensitised public motivates news editors and journalists to ‘hunt for the 
more dramatic,’ and higher thresholds to shock demand higher levels of atrocity 
and pain.lxxxii It is true that the modern dissemination of sensationalist images 
through a range of online and social media platforms eviscerates or negates 
content, and constant bombardment leads to a point of saturation (without 
understanding), callousness, apathy, and the ‘deadening of feeling.’lxxxiii Sontag 
has highlighted both the instability of compassion and of attention. The former 
needs to be acted upon or it will wither and waste away, while the latter needs to 
be constantly jump started, resulting in an image-glut that keeps ‘attention light, 
mobile, relatively indifferent to content.’ lxxxiv  In On Photography, Sontag 
concludes that this culture of spectatorship characterised by the ‘relentless 
diffusion of vulgar and appalling images’ reduces our capacity to respond with 
emotional vigour, but she later questions whether ‘our culture of spectatorship 
neutralizes the moral force of photographs of atrocities.’lxxxv The assumption that 
images of atrocity have little effect or that there is an inherent cynicism in their 
diffusion through the media were no more than untested truisms for Sontag, 
concluding in her final book that ‘harrowing photographs do not inevitably lose 
their power to shock’ and to haunt. lxxxvi Haunting occurs because the visual 
iconography of vulnerable lives ‘heading toward their own destruction’ is 
present in every photograph of people.lxxxvii The frozen expressions of individuals 
who have since passed away undoubtedly capture the vulnerability, frailty and 
mortality of man and testify to ‘time’s relentless melt.’lxxxviii  
Photography reveals twin temporalities; firstly, as dissociated moments that 
flash up in a ‘Benjaminian sense… they are always atomic and punctual and 
discrete.’lxxxix In these memento mori time is arrested; the photograph ‘is a thin 
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slice of space as well as time.’xc Yet, on the other hand, time frozen in the image 
creates a contradiction or a schism at the heart of photography, because the 
photograph ‘is a kind of promise that the event will continue,’ a powerful 
proposition with potentially profound consequences for the photographer and 
the subject.xci The digitalization of torture and suffering means that going over 
the scene retrospectively promises ‘a further visual consumption of the sadistic 
pleasure of the event.’xcii The potential transcendence of the image can confer 
immortality on the event, exploited to further subjugate victims when 
orchestrating such photography without consent: ‘after the event has ended, the 
picture will still exist.’xciii Asymmetrical power relations are preserved in the 
unchanging image, which serves as a commemoration of humiliation: the 
photograph’s subjects are objectified, de-realised and dehumanised forever. 
There is a repetitive abuse on reserve through this type of photography and 
movie making. In the Abu Ghraib photographs, Butler contends that the 
temporality of the event was destroyed by its continuance in the photograph, 
because ‘the indefinite circulability of the image allows the event to continue to 
happen and, indeed, thanks to these images, the event has not stopped 
happening.’xciv However, the infinite temporality of the digitalisation of suffering 
also presents the possibility of the visual record turning against the perpetrator, 
which can be exploited in future legal or disciplinary settings as evidence.  
One cannot assume that the enjoyment of photography revelling in the 
suffering of others would automatically be shared by others, as ‘[n]o “we” should 
be taken for granted when the subject is looking at other people’s pain.’xcv 
Examining lynching pictures taken in the United States between the 1890s and 
1930s, which were kept as mementos and made into postcards, Sontag notes 
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that while they ‘tell us about human wickedness,’ they are also troubling because 
of the quotidienne nature of extreme racism they depict.xcvi Are we better off for 
viewing these pictures, ‘is looking at such pictures really necessary’?xcvii If 
viewing reduces us to the role of voyeur, then the exercise seems futile. However, 
it is important to apprehend visual representations of man’s inhumanity to man, 
because under a fresh gaze (informed by human rights norms and principles), 
the transitive function to mourn, eclipsed in the original socio-cultural 
framework, is activated, and we can say, ‘do not forget this not too distant 
history’. The photographs ‘turn against’ the original participants: ‘the grinning 
spectators’ and the ‘good churchgoing citizens’ of the lynching photos.xcviii Whilst 
the frame is immortalised, the referential paradigm in which the event is 
understood changes, depending on the ‘purpose for which they are invoked.’xcix  
For abusive photography embedded in politico-military contexts, the 
‘turning against’ life stage of the image is essential for subsequent disciplinary or 
legal proceedings. The Abu Ghraib photographs, in travelling outside the original 
scene, ‘left the hands of the photographer, or turned against the photographer 
him or herself, even perhaps vanquished his or her pleasure.’c Eleven individuals 
were convicted by martial courts for abuses depicted in the photographs 
instrumentalised in ‘radically different directions’.ci  
Similar pictures from British occupied Iraq emerged; an anthology of 
violence captured in the Camp Breadbasket photographs. These images depict 
patterns of abuse, such as ‘beasting,’ whereby detainees were forced to run 
around the camp while being beaten on the legs. cii A smiling British soldier 
operates a forklift with an Iraqi man tied to the front prongs of the machine.ciii 
Several photographs were taken of restrained detainees about to be kicked or 
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punched by soldiers. There were also photographs that depicted naked detainees 
being forced to adopt compromising sexual positions.civ In these scenes of 
simulated anal and oral sex between male detainees, Muslim taboos were 
exploited so as to attack gender and cultural norms.cv The reinterpretation of the 
trophy photographs as evidence of crime occurred when staff at a film 
processing shop in England, tasked with developing photographs from the 
operation, realised their significance and alerted the authorities. Perhaps what 
was shocking to staff was the ‘moral indifference’ to the ‘human suffering in the 
scene,’ couched in a culture where such actions were not condemned.cvi Court 
martial proceedings followed and four soldiers were found guilty of mistreating 
Iraqi civilians, receiving sentences ranging from 140 days to two years 
imprisonment.cvii Of course, leaking visual materials exposing extra-judicial 
violence and brutality does not necessarily mean that the guilty parties will be 
prosecuted. Much will depend on the politico-legal climate of the day as the 
Chelsea Manning case attests.cviii 
 
III. Atrocity Crimes & International Law 
 
The Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court recalls the 
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shocked ‘the conscience of humanity,’ 
costing millions of lives in the 20th century and threatening ‘the peace, security 
and well-being of the world.’cix As a consequence, the international community 
prosecutes these crimes, listed in the Statute as genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.cx Substantively, international 
 17
lawmakers recognized that new categories of criminal law had to be codified to 
capture the egregious nature of ‘extreme evil.’cxi Thus international interest 
stems from two related justifications. The first is deontological, insofar as these 
crimes are so severe that they victimize all of humanity and therefore 
jurisdiction is elevated to the supranational level. The second concern Mark 
Drumbl describes as pragmatic, because extraordinary international crimes can 
trigger ‘security concerns, threaten regional stability, affect the viability of 
groups, and induce cross-border refugee movements.’cxii  
David Scheffer regards atrocity crimes as collectively executed crimes of 
such a destructive character that they are inimical to human rights and 
international peace and security ‘in an increasingly interdependent and 
sophisticated global society.’cxiii Scheffer identifies several overlapping bodies of 
law, such as international criminal law, international humanitarian law, and 
international human rights law, underpinning the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals 
established to prosecute the most serious crimes of international concern.cxiv 
William Schabas outlines the manner in which crimes are incorporated into the 
international law lexicon.cxv Some crimes are added to the taxonomy because 
they attack universal values, but others simply because of the politico-legal 
predilections of relevant stakeholders. Schabas observes that the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon attempted to establish terrorism as an international 
crime.cxvi Some crimes for which international tribunals have jurisdiction, such as 
genocide and crimes against humanity, stem from international human rights 
law, whilst other crimes, such as the crime of aggression and war crimes, had 
earlier antecedents in post-World War II litigation, as well as treaty based and 
customary humanitarian law.cxvii  
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In essence, the principle that only the most serious crimes would be 
prosecuted by international criminal law is mirrored by provisions of 
international human rights law, such as Art 6(2) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which prohibits capital punishment except for 
the ‘most serious of crimes.’cxviii  Schabas takes seriousness as crucial to 
international status and he argues that international law ‘cannot leave individual 
states with the option of deciding what constitute “serious crimes” for the 
purpose of determining their treaty obligations.’cxix Thus, the focus of concern 
here is the most serious violations of international human rights law (usually 
torture and right to life violations), crimes set out by the Rome Statute, and grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Of course, several different bodies of law 
may overlap when considering jurisdiction for atrocity crimes, and the next 
section examines how the visual record reflects these crimes where jurisdiction 
has been established.  
International human rights law protects the right to life as a non-derogable 
article in various treaties, regional instruments, and declarations.cxx The extra-
territorial effect of human rights treaties means that state parties are bound to 
respect the codified rights when exercising control over individuals or territories 
outside their jurisdiction.cxxi Furthermore, in situations of conflict human rights 
law co-exists and complements other bodies of international law, such as 
international humanitarian law. The lex specialis or the rules with greater 
specificity supplant more general provisions and should frame the response to 
suspected violations during war or conflict.cxxii Photographic or visual evidence 
suggesting the use of lethal force by state agents could trigger procedural 
obligations to carry out an effective investigation into the killing.cxxiii Whilst not 
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specifically citing photographic evidence, the UN Human Rights Committee 
recommended that both the UK and the US governments conduct prompt and 
independent investigations into suspicious deaths and allegations of torture, 
cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment inflicted by state party personnel in 
detention facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan.cxxiv 
The UN Convention Against Torture (1984) provides a comprehensive 
definition of torture in Article 1(1), 
 
[T]he term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him 
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing 
him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such 
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful 
sanctions.cxxv 
 
This definition signifies the twin-track relationship that photography has with 
the prohibition on torture. Abusive photography connotes interplay between the 
image producing device, its author, the camera’s subject and the scene designed 
to intensify the victim’s mental suffering. Degradation and humiliation is 
increased by the threat to wider dissemination as temporality is interrupted and 
expanded in the photograph. Acts designed to elicit mental suffering are also 
prohibited by Article 7 of the ICCPR, by Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and Article 5 of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, 
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as well as other regional instruments. Article 2 of the UN Convention Against 
Torture imposes a duty on state parties to give legislative, judicial and 
administrative effect to the prohibition on torture, pointing to the second 
essential function of the visual - as evidence in the prosecution of official acts of 
torture.cxxvi  
There are very few references to photographic or video materials in the 
jurisprudence of the Committee Against Torture.cxxvii Most of these references 
pertain to visual identification, with two noteworthy exceptions, the first being 
the MN v Switzerland case in which the applicant submitted photographic 
evidence of his brother ‘in which it is clear that he has lost an arm,’ to support his 
claim that he would be tortured if returned to Bangladesh, which was rejected by 
the Committee.cxxviii Visual materials were also mentioned in A.S. v Sweden; the 
applicant submitted that she was sentenced to death in absentia for adultery in 
Iran and had been informed ‘that the authorities had found films and 
photographs of the couple in the Christian man’s apartment, which had been 
used as evidence.’cxxix Although no photographic evidence was shown to the 
Committee (nor indeed to the Swedish Immigration Board or the Aliens Appeal 
Board), A.S.’s claim was successful on the basis of her own testimony, 
corroborated by her son, and wider information about human rights abuses in 
Iran.cxxx  
The Human Rights Committee may also investigate allegations of torture 
under Article 7 of the ICCPR and did so in respect of the Daljit Singh v Canada 
application. Singh submitted photographs which purportedly established that ‘he 
and some of his family members [were] victims of torture,’ however, the state 
party disputed the veracity of these photos.cxxxi Ultimately, the Committee 
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deemed the communication inadmissible under Article 2 of the Optional Protocol 
because the author had not sufficiently adduced evidence ‘in support of a claim 
to the effect that he would be exposed to a real and imminent risk of violations of 
articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant if deported to India.’cxxxii Interestingly, in another 
non-refoulement case heard by the Human Rights Committee, Masih Shakeel v 
Canada, the applicant provided ‘a photo of his dead brother, who had died as a 
result of internal bleeding following the attack on him.’cxxxiii The Committee 
upheld Shakeel’s application to prevent his deportation to Pakistan because the 
Canadian government had not sufficiently explored the ‘author’s allegations 
about the real risk he might face if deported to his country of origin,’ potentially 
in violation of Articles 6(1) and Article 7 of the Covenant.cxxxiv While it is unclear 
how the probative value of the photo factored into this decision, the Committee 
did acknowledge that a Canadian Federal Court had accepted that the applicant’s 
brother was ‘beaten to death by unknown individuals.’cxxxv 
Within international humanitarian law the visual field can be apprehended 
in similar ways; firstly, by reference to rules governing the treatment of 
protected persons, and secondly, as evidence substantiating breaches of 
humanitarian norms and customs. Whilst atrocity crimes or ‘unimaginable 
atrocities,’ such as crimes against humanity and genocide may occur in 
peacetime, they mostly occur in situations of conflict. cxxxvi  International 
humanitarian law is a body of rules applicable both in situations of non-
international and international armed conflict.cxxxvii Article 27 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention indicates that protected persons, such as civilians, refugees, 
prisoners of war and other detainees, as well as the injured or sick not actively 
taking part in hostilities, 
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[…] are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their 
family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. 
They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all 
acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.cxxxviii  
 
This ban on public curiosity connotes a ‘ban on photographs or films identifying 
a detainee’s face.’cxxxix Whilst such photography is a violation of Article 27, it 
would not constitute a war crime, but when abusive photography is implicated in 
acts of torture this may violate the prohibition on torture and cruel treatment, 
outlined in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Referencing the Abu 
Ghraib photos, Butler maintains that ‘poor treatment […] does not defy 
international law and put the US in direct violation of the Geneva Accord, a 
situation that could bring the US before the World Court or the International 
Criminal Court.’cxl  However, ‘inhuman treatment,’ ‘outrages upon personal 
dignity,’ and ‘humiliating and degrading treatment’ do constitute grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions and are defined as crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court.cxli And whilst the United States has not ratified 
the Rome Statute, the prohibition on torture and cruel treatment may be found 
in various US military manuals, violations of which give rise to martial law 
jurisdiction.cxlii 
The second key modality of the visual record is to constitute evidence of 
probative value testifying to war crimes, which are ‘serious violations of the laws 
and customs applicable in international armed conflict’ and ‘serious violations of 
the laws and customs applicable in an armed conflict not of an international 
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character.’cxliii The statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) all have jurisdiction for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, and the specific role of visual 
evidence in prosecuting war crimes (and other crimes) is examined below. 
Generally, war crimes involve death, injury, or the destruction of property. 
Furthermore, acts which breach important values, such as abusing dead bodies, 
subjecting persons to humiliating treatment, or the recruitment of child soldiers 
may amount to war crimes.cxliv Visual media can accurately depict the mutilation 
or desecration of dead bodies, the wanton destruction of property including 
attacks on protected objects, as well as testifying to the involvement of children 
in armies. Whereas most national military manuals prohibit war crimes, many of 
these do not include seriousness as critical to whether an act is defined as a war 
crime.cxlv 
Studying the visual landscape integrated into international criminal law 
similarly lends itself to a twin track approach, firstly, by interrogating whether 
abusive photography could itself constitute a crime prosecutable by an 
international court or tribunal. Thereafter, the role of visual representation 
critical to the evidentiary matrix for atrocity crimes in international criminal 
forums is explored. Under the Rome Statute, the Court has jurisdiction for war 
crimes ‘in particular when committed as part of plan or policy or as part of a 
large-scale commission of such crimes,’ whereas neither the statute of the ICTY 
nor the ICTR contain this caveat.cxlvi Reflecting customary humanitarian norms 
outlined above, the Court has jurisdiction over grave breaches or serious 
violations of the Geneva Conventions occurring in the context of international 
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armed conflict and it also lists prohibited acts for non-international armed 
conflict in a much more detailed way than its ad hoc counterparts.cxlvii There are 
no cases where the crux of a war crime prosecution hinges on the actual act of 
photography in international criminal law jurisprudence. In theory, abusive 
photography occurring during either international or non-international armed 
conflict could constitute a war crime justiciable by the International Criminal 
Court (where it has jurisdiction).cxlviii 
Eleven specified categories of actioncxlix when committed ‘as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack’ are defined as crimes against humanity under the Rome 
Statute.cl Of particular relevance to this discussion are torture and ‘other 
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.’cli Unlike the ad hoc 
tribunals, the Rome Statute clarifies the meaning of these terms in a subsequent 
paragraph, defining torture as ‘the intentional infliction of severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the 
control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.’clii Contrasting 
the CAT definition, the purpose of torture need not be the extraction of 
information from the victim, nor does it have to be conducted by an individual 
acting in an official capacity for international criminal responsibility to adhere. 
Could abusive photography on a wide scale be considered a crime against 
humanity? It is conceivable, though improbable, that if such acts constituted the 
sole method of torture and ill treatment in a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population it could meet the definition of torture provided in 
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the Rome Statute. However, the main relevance of photography to international 
criminal law is in providing the evidentiary basis of crimes. Visual information is 
critical to documentary dossiers in cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity.  
 
 
IV. Visual Evidence in International Law 
 
International criminal courts and tribunals incorporate rules governing 
procedure from both the common law and civil law traditions. With regard to the 
common law tradition, Richard May and Marieke Wierda point out that the 
evidence admitted must be relevant and probative.cliii The probative value of 
evidence relates to its capacity to prove something in court, which always has to 
be weighed against the possibility of prejudicing a jury, leading to restrictions 
and exclusions on the admission of evidence in common law. By contrast, within 
an inquisitorial system, evidence can be admitted which judges will 
subsequently evaluate for its probative value. International tribunals have drawn 
from both traditions to achieve fairness, demonstrating flexibility in the 
apprehension of documentary evidence quite distinct from the ‘technical rules of 
evidence sometimes found in national jurisdictions.’cliv Visual materials, such as 
photographs and video recordings, fall under the rubric of documentary 
evidence, set out by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda during the 
Musema trial as consisting of  
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[…] documents produced as evidence for evaluation by the Tribunal. For the purposes of 
this case, the term “document” is interpreted broadly, being understood to mean 
anything in which information of any description is recorded. This interpretation is wide 
enough to cover not only documents in writing, but also maps, sketches, plans, 
calendars, graphs, drawings, computerized records, mechanical records, electro-
magnetic records, digital records, databases, sound tracks, audio-tapes, video-tapes, 
photographs, slides and negatives.clv   
 
Every court and tribunal has its own set of rules governing procedure. May and 
Wierda note that the Trial Chamber in the Tadic case held that while the Statute 
of the ICTY is not an international treaty but a sui generis legal instrument, the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is applicable to matters of 
interpretation and, in particular, the Tribunal’s ability to ‘mold its rules and 
procedures to fit the task at hand,’ which is ‘to do justice, to deter further crimes 
and to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace.’clvi 
Both sides may admit visual artifacts as documentary evidence to support 
their arguments and, similar to the ICTR, the ICTY holds that pursuant to Rule 
89(C) documentary dossiers including ‘expert reports, orders, transcripts of 
intercepted communications, exhumation reports, photographs, maps, news 
agency reports, and audio tapes,’ may be admitted. clvii  Some of these 
documentary dossiers are basically reports prepared by prosecution 
investigators in the field.clviii Of course, all courts and tribunals are underpinned 
by regulations regarding the treatment of exculpatory evidence, such as Rule 68 
of the ICTY, which was consistently ignored by the Office of the Prosecutor in 
Oric, culminating in the disclosure of two additional documents and a video to 
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the defense only a week prior to the final judgment, much to the exasperation of 
the court.clix 
There is a pattern in the way that documentary evidence is used in these 
contexts, which was neatly detailed in Musema (ICTR). The general rule is that 
oral testimony or other forms of independent evidence is used to corroborate 
the documentary evidence. In this sense, 
 
[…] independent evidence may be used to “corroborate”, support, prove or disprove the 
authenticity and probative value of documentary evidence, once that independent 
evidence has been admitted. This principle is not limited to the use of oral testimony in 
supporting documentary evidence: it permits the use of multiple documents in mutual 
support (for example the combined use of maps, photographs and videos.clx 
 
Likewise, documentary evidence can be used to corroborate oral testimony, 
secondary evidence, or hearsay evidence, and in this matrix multiple pieces of 
evidence operate simultaneously from which trends that testify to the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence may be deduced.clxi Thus, in bearing witness to 
atrocity crimes, photography and visual media can form documentary evidence 
with ‘probative value’ testifying to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes. The ICC is governed by Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which may also 
be supplemented by provisional rules drafted by the Court.clxii Evidence must be 
reliable and, similar to the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC has demonstrated flexibility 
in balancing the probative value of such evidence against ‘any prejudice [it] may 
cause to a fair trial’ by being ruled admissible.clxiii 
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An E-Protocol guiding the submission of digital evidence to the ICC has two 
essential criteria for validation. The first concerns internal indicators, the 
metadata attaching to digital photos and videos (such as time and date stamps, 
and GPS coordinates), and the second pertains to information regarding the 
external identification of evidence, including the chain of custody ‘in 
chronological order, the identity of the source, the original author and recipient 
information, and the author and recipient’s respective organizations.’ clxiv 
However, even where authentication has not been established using internal or 
external indicators, evidence may still be admitted. In the Bemba case, 
recordings that were not authenticated in court were still ‘admitted, as in-court 
authentication is but one factor for the Chamber to consider when determining 
an item’s authenticity and probative value.’clxv Similarly in Tolimir (ICTY), aerial 
photographs taken by US satellites were admitted in the absence of any 
information ‘on their origin, the method of their creation, the manner of their 
editing, how to interpret them or whether they were delivered to the 
Prosecution in their original form or previously modified.’clxvi Overlooking the 
absence of external indicators, the Trial Chamber found that the lack of source 
information did not necessarily impair the ‘credibility of the aerial images in 
general,’ which were accepted as evidence upon the corroboration of OTP 
investigators who testified to their provenance, but did not disclose the methods 
of collection.clxvii 
A spectrum of visual iconography showing wide ranging subject matter is 
generally integrated into these dossiers of evidence. At one end, images depicting 
group affiliation can cast aspertions on the defendant’s claims of innocence. For 
example, video recordings showing Mathieu Ngirumpatse and Edouard 
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Karemara at several National Republican Movement for Democracy and 
Development (MRND) rallies were admitted into evidence during their trial at 
the ICTR.clxviii The Prosecution established that Karemara and Ngirumpatse were 
members of the MRND executive leadership - a key organisation involved in the 
commission of genocide in Rwanda.clxix During these rallies, calls for Hutu power 
were frequent, and one recording depicts the defendants addressing a crowd 
gathered at Nyamirambo Stadium in Kigali at which the Interahamwe provided 
entertainment.clxx Whilst not directly exhibiting criminality, the recordings 
formed a hub within the wider matrix of documentary evidence used to convict 
Karemara and Ngirumpatse of ‘genocide, conspiracy to commit and direct and 
public incitement of the same, rape and extermination as crimes against 
humanity and serious violations of Common Article 3.’clxxi In the same way, video 
recordings of the well-known Rwandan composer and singer, Simon Bikindi, 
performing at various MRND rallies were introduced as evidence during his trial 
at the ICTR. The Trial Chamber described Bikindi’s appearance at an MRND rally 
in 1993 where he performed, ‘celebrating the victories of the MRND and 
Interahamwe.’clxxii Whilst Bikindi was convicted of incitement to genocide, this 
conviction hinged on statements he made at a roadblock while the genocide was 
ongoing, rather than the manner in which his music was used to galvanise 
violence during the slaughter.clxxiii 
Also litigated at the ICTR was a high profile media case that involved the 
prosecution of three individuals constituting a ‘common media front,’ who 
together with the political party Coalition pour la defense de la republique (CDR) 
‘made up a Hutu power coalition that defined the enemy as the Tutsi ethnic 
group, normalized ethnic hatred as political ideology, and orchestrated 
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killings.’clxxiv Along with Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza 
(leading figures within Radio Television Libre des Mille collines (RTLM), a radio 
station dubbed ‘Machete Radio’), Hassan Ngeze, the founder, owner and editor of 
Kangura magazine, was found guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide, genocide, 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and persecution and 
extermination as crimes against humanity.clxxv  Notwithstanding subsequent 
technical legal arguments on appeal, during Trial Chamber deliberations visual 
evidence exhibited dual modalities. clxxvi  Firstly, several photographs were 
produced of Ngeze amongst CDR supporters or wearing CDR colors 
demonstrating his involvement in an organisation that promoted the genocide. 
Whilst acknowledging that a CDR tie had been superimposed on an image of 
Ngeze published in Kangura, because he did not later distance ‘himself from the 
impression created by this photograph,’ the Chamber found that Ngeze 
sympathised with and supported the CDR party.clxxvii When cross-examined 
about another photograph published by Kangura in which he appeared with 
several people wearing CDR t-shirts and caps, Ngeze claimed that it was taken at 
a football match. However, his co-defendant Nahimana confessed that it showed 
a CDR meeting, which the court ultimately found more convincing.clxxviii A second 
key function of visual evidence in this case, perhaps unique since Julius 
Streicher’s conviction of incitement to genocide for his Der Stürmer publications 
at Nuremberg, was to provide a visual and textual anthology of materials upon 
which incitement to genocide could be established.clxxix A key example of this was 
the cover of Kangura No. 26, which featured the picture of the former President 
and Hutu ‘emancipation’ leader, Gregoire Kayibanda, with a textual reference to 
re-launching the revolution and posing the question, ‘what weapon shall we use 
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to conquer the Inyensi [Tutsi] once and for all?’ alongside a photo of a 
machete.clxxx  
The gaze of the court may fix on the visual when it chronicles evidence of 
physical injury. Scars from bullet wounds are commonly shown,clxxxi but in a case 
against high ranking members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) at the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, a photograph depicting markings where rebels 
had carved ‘RUF and/or AFRC [Armed Forces Revolutionary Council] on the 
bodies of all the captured civilians’ was admitted.clxxxii It is interesting to note 
that during General Galic’s prosecution at the ICTY, photographic evidence 
showing bullet wound scars on a victim’s back was favoured by the court over a 
medical certificate that presented a different account of how the injuries were 
acquired. In the court’s estimation, the photograph was determinative because it 
corroborated the witness’s testimony regarding the ‘point of entry and exit of the 
bullet’ and supported a theory about the direction of gunfire overlooked by the 
medical report.clxxxiii Visual media had a crucial role in the guilty verdict against 
Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura at the ICTY on the basis of their 
command responsibility for the ill-treatment of detainees. clxxxiv  Several 
individuals detained at Motel Sretno in Kakanj (current day Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) filmed their injuries following release and these clips were 
subsequently viewed by the court, which together with statements from three 
detainees, led the chamber to conclude that serious bodily harm was inflicted on 
the detainees and the ‘perpetrators of the mistreatment intended to cause the 
prisoners at Motel Sretno serious pain and suffering.’clxxxv Finally, photographic 
evidence contributed to Charles Taylor’s conviction for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.clxxxvi These images depicted eye and limb amputations; a 
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medical doctor working at a Freetown hospital photographed two individuals 
who had had their eyes removed. One of the photographs depicted a young 
nursing mother, whose eyes were ‘protruding from the sockets,’ pulled out to 
prevent her from identifying her attackers.clxxxvii These exhibits, together with the 
doctor’s testimony and a confidential exhibit, led the court to find that the rebels 
‘caused serious physical suffering and injury to the amputation and mutilation 
victims.’clxxxviii A photograph taken by the international photo-journalist Corinne 
Dufka of a 13-year girl with double hand amputations corroborated the 
‘widespread nature of these amputations,’ reflecting the definition of crimes 
against humanity provided by Article 2 of the Statute of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone.clxxxix 
Visual evidence clearly established a link between Thomas Lubanga and the 
conscription of child soldiers in a case stemming from the Democratic Republic 
of Congo heard at the ICC. Lubanga was Commander in Chief of the Union des 
Patriotes Congolais (UPC), which had a military wing, the Force Patriotique pour 
la Liberation du Congo (FPLC). The Chamber concluded that Lubanga, together 
with his principle co-perpetrators, initiated and implemented a common plan to 
establish politico-military control over the Ituri region, which entailed the 
conscription of boys and girls under the age of 15 into the UPC/FPLC. Video 
evidence was critical to Lubanga’s conviction; firstly, as it established that he met 
with his staff, members of the military and demonstrated his ‘active role in 
making decisions and issuing instructions.’cxc However, even more crucially, a 
video was admitted showing Lubanga in military attire addressing UPC/FPLC 
recruits clearly under the age of 15 at a training camp in February 2003, where 
he ‘spoke to the recruits and encouraged them in their military training, and he 
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said that as soon as it was completed, they would be provided with weapons, 
prior to being deployed to protect the population. He indicated they would be 
useful soldiers in the field.’cxci This recording, when considered alongside eye 
witness testimony, persuaded the court that Lubanga used children in his 
personal escort and bodyguard, and, in particular, the video footage, provided 
‘compelling evidence on Thomas Lubanga’s level of knowledge, which is directly 
relevant to the mental element of the charges.’cxcii 
Visual evidence can attest to the destruction of civilian objects, such as 
dwellings, religious buildings, cultural property, historic monuments and 
educational institutions, which, in the context of armed conflict and unjustified 
by military necessity, may constitute war crimes.cxciii  At the ICTY, aerial 
photography produced by the US Department of Defense depicted the bazaar in 
Priština burning, whilst other photographs admitted into evidence during 
Vlastimir Đorđević’s trial illustrated that the mosque had been heavily 
damaged.’cxciv In examining photographs depicting damage to a 16th century 
mosque in Brestovac/Brestoc (current day Croatia), expert witness for the 
Prosecution, Andrs Riedlmayer charactertised it as ‘almost destroyed.’cxcv Indeed, 
the Chamber found Đorđević guilty of persecution as a crime against humanity 
through his participation in a joint criminal enterprise that targeted Kosovo 
Albanians on racial grounds, and that, inter alia, destroyed and damaged 
property of cultural or religious significance to this group.cxcvi Similar evidence 
was tendered in the Tihomir Blaškić case.cxcvii General Blaškić was convicted of 
several charges, including ‘the destruction and plunder of property and, in 
particular, of institutions dedicated to religion or education,’ which was 
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categorised by the court both as a crime against humanity and a violation of the 
laws and customs of war.cxcviii  
Separately, also at the ICTY, Pavle Strugar was successfully prosecuted for, 
amongst other things, the destruction and wilful damage ‘to institutions 
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic 
monuments and works or art and science,’ in violation of Article 3 of the ICTY 
Statute. cxcix  This devastation was depicted in a video clip of the Old Town of 
Dubrovnik, a designated UNESCO world heritage site, showing considerable 
damage and ‘fires burning fiercely in many of its locales.’cc Video evidence 
regarding widespread destruction to villages in the Laska Valley was also 
significant in the prosecution of Dario Kordic and Mario Certez.cci Kordic and 
Certez were both found guilty of violating the customs of war with respect to the 
destruction of religious or educational institutions.ccii The physical destruction of 
property in these cases occurred within the wider context of violence and 
killing.cciii By contrast, at the International Criminal Court, Ahmad al-Faqi al-
Mahdi pleaded guilty to the war crime of attacking objects protected by the 
Rome Statute for his role in the destruction of UNESCO heritage sites at 
Timbuktu (Mali).cciv This was the first time that the destruction of cultural 
heritage was the sole focus of prosecution, sustained by irrefutable photographic 
and video evidence showing the active destruction of the mausoleums, including 
comments made by al-Mahdi to journalists while the demolition was ongoing.ccv 
Visual evidence at the crux of international criminal prosecutions usually 
attests to more serious crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, or 
war crimes. Indeed, the ICTR admitted video footage taken by the British 
photographer Simon Cox, showing human bodies in the Kagera river near the 
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Tanzanian border, ‘floating by at the rate of several corpses per minute.’ccvi Cox 
also photographed the dead in several churches, evidence which led the 
Chamber to conclude that in view of the widespread killings, the first 
requirement ‘for there to be genocide’ had been met, and the defendant, Jean 
Paul Akayesu, was found guilty of genocide, direct and public incitement to 
genocide, and crimes against humanity.ccvii Photographic materials collated by 
the forensic anthropologist, Dr William Haglund, indicated that mass killings had 
occurred in a cave in the Bisesero sector of Rwanda.ccviii In June 1994, hundreds 
of Tutsis who sought refuge there were subjected to a grenade attack and the 
cave was set alight. Over a year later, Dr Haglund observed the remains ‘of many 
individuals, men, women and children protruding from the mud that had 
covered them up in the intervening rainy season, and at minimum, I observed at 
least 40 people in this area.’ccix His expert testimony corroborated an account 
told by the sole survivor of the attack and the two defendants, Clement 
Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, were held criminally responsible for the 
massacre, which when taken alongside culpability for other atrocities, amounted 
to genocide.ccx 
Photographic and visual materials tendered as evidence at the ICTY depicted 
bodies with fatal gunshot wounds,ccxi some with the cause of death unknown,ccxii 
blood splatters, blood stains and human tissue,ccxiii as well as burnt bodies.ccxiv 
Whereas these photographs suggest the occurrence of criminal violence, the 
perpetrators are missing from the frame.ccxv There are exceptions; visual 
evidence actually showing the commission of a crime, which can be authoritative 
in a judicial setting. A series of photographs illustrating an execution sequence 
may have influenced Goran Jelisic’s guilty plea at the ICTY. It is interesting to 
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note that the Chamber only accorded ‘relative weight to his plea’ due to the 
probative value of the photographs showing Jelisic committing crimes.ccxvi The 
execution of six Bosnian Muslim men from Srebrenica was captured on video by 
a member of the Serb Scorpions unit and ultimately contributed to the conviction 
not of the individual perpetrators depicted on film, but of their military 
superiors.ccxvii  
In fact, authors of atrocity display a finely tuned awareness that visual media 
may betray them. Slobodan Medic, implicated in the abovementioned Skorpions’ 
unit execution, later tried to ‘collect all the tapes and destroy them.’ccxviii During 
Casimir Bizimungu’s prosecution (ICTR), it was revealed that the accused 
‘attempted to conceal the massacres in Kigali. During a meeting on 11 April 1994, 
Bizimungu told workers to get rid of the corpses before the white people took 
photographs of them.’ccxix Concealment of crimes precludes the existence of such 
evidence. When a truck carrying bodies of murdered Kosovo Albanians crashed 
into a river near Kladova revealing ‘two legs, an arm, and pieces of clothing 
protruding through a crack on the back door of the refrigerated freight container 
of the truck,’ a witness who had managed to take some photographs ‘depicting 
the back of the freight truck with a leg protruding from a crack on the door’ was 
prohibited from photographing the bodies being removed from the truck, as the 
local police chief, Caslav Golubovi, did not want the incident to attract any 
publicity.ccxx Golubovi’s superior, Đorđević, was found guilty of murder as a war 
crime and a crime against humanity, with the Chamber concluding the evidence 
demonstrated that ‘at the local level, as well at the highest levels in Belgrade, the 
MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia] sought to conceal the discovery and 
origin of the bodies of over 80 ethnic Kosovo Albanians removed from the 
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refrigerated truck that was found in the Danube river on 4 April 1999.’ccxxi 
Similarly, General Zdravko Tolimir prohibited the ‘filming and photographing of 
prisoners’ on the Zvornik-Vlasenica Road and POWs on the main Milici-Zvornik 
Road were to be removed ‘somewhere out of sight from the ground or air.’ccxxii  
During Tharcisse Muvunyi’s ICTR trial, a witness recalled that when the 
defendant addressed a crowd in his capacity as an officer of the Rwandan Army, 
he criticised their actions not because the group had executed innocent people, 
but because they had left ‘bodies on the hills, which were being photographed by 
satellites.’ccxxiii Aerial photography can reveal surface disturbances indicative of 
execution sites and mass graves, providing leads for onsite forensic 
investigators.ccxxiv Indeed, aerial photography taken by the US satellites showing 
the presence of surface disturbances was admitted as evidence in the 
prosecution of Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic at the ICTY.ccxxv On the basis of 
this evidence, two teams of forensic investigators were deployed to the region, 
where they uncovered a mass grave with 33 male victims at one site and 12 men 
interred at another site.ccxxvi Aerial photographs produced by the US showing the 
existence of mass graves resulted in Security Council Resolution 1010 
demanding that ‘Bosnian Serb authorities allow UN and ICRC observers to enter 
into Srebrenica.’ccxxvii Given the modern omnipotence of satellite imaging, if 
atrocity crimes are occurring on earth, it will be practically impossible for 
perpetrators to conceal their acts or to prevent aerial photography from 
emerging.ccxxviii 
Forensic photography forms a particular category of visual material within 
dossiers of evidence presented to international courts and tribunals litigating 
atrocity crimes.ccxxix Photography and image producing technologies are essential 
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to the exhumation and examination process associated with the excavation of 
individual and mass graves where atrocity crimes are suspected.ccxxx At Batajnica 
in Serbia, several grave sites were identified, five of which were mass graves and 
during the excavation ‘[a]t every stage the entire scene was photographed, 
video-recorded and sketches were made. Photographs were used as an auxiliary 
resource for identification and to help establish a possible cause of death.’ccxxxi In 
court, forensic photographs serve a variety of functions. They may be entered 
into evidence to corroborate exhumation reports.ccxxxii Autopsy photographs also 
function to support evidence from the exhumation process.ccxxxiii  Forensic 
photographs may substantiate descriptions of what the victim was wearing 
when last seen alive.ccxxxiv Such evidence is recorded by forensic pathologists in 
the course of their work, to document and support theories about causes of 
death. ccxxxv  When technical evidence is collated, independent experts can 
evaluate and comment on its provenance. In this way, the French forensic 
pathologist, Eric Baccard, synthesised an overview report from disparate 
forensic reports compiled by national teams across Kosovo. ccxxxvi  Baccard 
analysed all of these reports, together with ‘photographs and videos made 
during their investigations and exhumations,’ and came to the conclusion that 
their scientific findings were sound, which was accepted by the Chamber during 
the Đorđević trial.ccxxxvii By contrast, Baccard’s analysis of a video in which he 
hypothesised on how individual victims had died was rejected by the Chamber as 
reflecting ‘forensic assumptions,’ and could not be relied upon in isolation to 
reach any ‘conclusion as to cause of death.’ccxxxviii 
Photography may also be in incorporated into ballistics reports tendered as 
evidence before international courts and tribunals. During General Stanislaw 
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Galic’s prosecution for crimes committed in Sarajevo (1992-1995), one witness 
reported that two bullets hit his apartment; this testimony was supported by 
photography and a video depicting the ‘entry points of the two bullets and where 
his wife was seated at the time of the incident.’ccxxxix In a separate incident also 
covered in Galic’s trial, police officers recorded the impact of bullets inside a 
restaurant by taking photographs at the crime scene and noting the bullet 
trajectories.ccxl Such evidence can be used to establish the direction of fire.ccxli A 
defence theory pertaining to photographic evidence of crater impacts was at 
odds with the prosecution hypothesis in this case, but the Chamber ultimately 
dismissed the defence’s argument about the trajectory of the mortar.ccxlii  Galic’s 
defence team also employed visual forensic evidence drawn from killing sites in 
the residential neighbourhood of Dobrinja which were photographed by a police 
crime technician and incorporated into the Viličić Shelling Report.ccxliii The 
Chamber accepted ‘the forensic evidence that the latter two shells were 120 mm 
calibre and flew in from the east and from east-northeast, respectively,’ but it 
rejected a claim made in the report that ‘one of these shells could have been fired 
from a distance of only 300 metres, which would have resulted in a near-vertical 
angle of descent and near-circular impact traces.’ccxliv A defence expert’s (Maj. 
Gen. Desimir Garovic) use of the ‘photogrammatic method’ was deemed 
unreliable by the Trial Chamber, which ruled that the photogrammatic method 
employed by Garovic as a way of establishing artillery projectiles was not 
convincing, particularly as he never visited the scene and based his conclusions 
on photographs alone.ccxlv  
Another important function of visual evidence is in the identification of 
suspects, ccxlvi  usually in a structured way, via photo boards and photo 
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spreads.ccxlvii Legally the identification of the accused as a perpetrator must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.ccxlviii This threshold can be difficult to meet 
due to certain material factors that may impinge on the prosecution’s use of 
photo boards and photo spreads. Substantively, a photo of the accused might 
accurately record the subject’s likeness at one point in time, but ‘may not be a 
typical likeness,’ and the quality or clarity of the photograph, together with 
‘limitations inherent in a small two-dimensional photograph,’ may differ from a 
three dimensional view of a person.ccxlix In judgment of Fatmir Limaj, Haradin 
Bala and Isak Muslin, the Trial Chamber (ICTY) placed significance on whether 
an ‘individual witness was familiar with the subject of identification and simply 
‘“recognising” someone previously known or “identifying” a stranger.’ccl To 
provide safeguards to the accused, ccli  the Chamber considered photo 
identification as being only one element of all the evidence presented by the 
Prosecution that has a ‘bearing on the identification of the Accused.’cclii In this 
case, the Prosecution did not discharge of its obligation in respect of Limaj and 
Musliu who were acquitted of crimes committed by the Kosovo Liberation Army 
in Kosovo with the issue of criminal responsibility turning, although not solely, 
‘on the question of identification.’ccliii  
The Trial Chamber of the ICTR has highlighted socio-cultural issues 
regarding the interpretation of visual evidence that challenges Western 
assumptions that such iconography represents the real. During Georges 
Rutaganda’s case, the Chamber considered various ‘social and cultural factors in 
assessing the testimony of some of the witnesses,’ such as their agricultural 
background, low educational attainment, and their profound unfamiliarity with 
methods of ‘identifying and testifying to some of the exhibits, such as 
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photographs of various locations, maps etc.’ccliv The Chamber adopted a similar 
approach in the prosecution of clergyman Elizaphan Ntakirutimana and his son, 
Gérard Ntakirutimana, for their role in the Rwandan genocide, concluding that it 
was not significant that a witness was unable to identify a church from a 
prosecution photograph, as the witness was ‘not used to identifying 
photographs.’cclv This sensitivity was expressed by the Trial Chamber in stating 
that ‘certain witnesses had difficulty in being specific as to dates, times, distances 
and locations, and appeared unfamiliar with the use of maps, films, photographs 
and other graphic representations.’ cclvi The Chamber refused to draw any 
adverse inferences from such reticence, recommending that the cultural 
sensitivity exhibited by parties to the proceedings should be extended ‘to the 
gathering and preparation of evidence.’cclvii The court criticised the Prosecutor’s 
use of aerial photography when other forms of identification were available.cclviii  
The foregoing signals the critical axis on which visual evidence turns in 
either corroborating or discounting witness testimony. Exculpatory evidence 
may be drawn from visual media, such as a video recording that was presented 
by Slavko Dokmanović to the ICTY to support his alibi.cclix Statements provided 
by a prosecution informant ‘Jean-Pierre’ in the Theoneste Bagosora case (ICTR) 
was corroborated by other witness testimony, as well as ‘video footage of him at 
an Interahamwe rally demonstrat[ing] that he was a well-placed member of the 
organisation.’cclx Similarly, photographs were admitted in the context of Clement 
Kayishema’s and Obed Ruzindana’s prosecution at the ICTR, which showed that 
it was possible for two witnesses to have an unobstructed view of the defendant 
while remaining concealed.cclxi In the same vein, the Trial Chamber in Đorđević 
accepted the truthfulness of Agim Jemini’s testimony, having viewed ‘photos 
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depicting his vantage point and the views from it.’cclxii Another significant piece of 
evidence admitted in Đorđević was a video taken by Dr Liri Loshi, deemed to 
conclusively depict the aftermath of events which occurred in the Izbica/Izbic 
region of Kosovo in March 1999, ‘as described in his [Loshi’s] evidence.’cclxiii The 
video depicts victims at several locations where they were killed, and the court 
found that it definitively proved that the victims had not been moved from 
elsewhere, as alleged by the defence. In an adversarial system, if visual evidence 
corroborates one narrative version of events, it is likely to weaken, dispel, or 
seriously damage the opposing view. 
Photographic evidence may also cast doubt on witness testimony.cclxiv Such 
discrepancies, if innocuous, may not necessarily discredit the witness; a 
photograph tendered as evidence during Emmanuel Ndindabahizi’s ICTR trial 
showed no vegetation where the witness was allegedly hidden, but the 
prosecution pointed out that the photo had been taken long after the event in 
question and that the bush had been removed in the meantime.cclxv However, 
contradictions may be indicative of more sinister motives to mislead or lie to the 
court. The way in which witnesses interface with visual documentary evidence 
may render their evidence implausible. During the Ljube Boskoski and Johan 
Tarculovski ICTY trial, two witnesses marked photographs indicating the 
direction from which an army position allegedly received fire, demonstrating to 
the Chamber ‘that their evidence of material events that morning [was] not 
honest.’ cclxvi  Ultimately, the probative value of some visual material can 
completely discredit witnesses. This occurred during Augustin Ngirabatware’s 
trial (ICTR) when witness DWAN-7 disputed ‘video footage contained in 
Prosecution Exhibit 32 depicting Ngirabatware with Interahamwe in a MRND 
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rally in 1992,’ suggesting that the footage had been manipulated, and as a result, 
the court found the witness’s testimony neither objective nor reliable.cclxvii 
Several pieces of visual evidence contributed to the documentary dossier in 
Major General Radislav Krstic’s prosecution for genocide in connection to 
Srebrenica, but two inculpatory videos were produced which directly 
contradicted his oral testimony.cclxviii In the first, Krstic is seen walking past 
soldiers belonging to the 10th Sabotage Detachment, but he later claimed that he 
was unaware of the presence of this unit in Srebrenica on the relevant date. The 
second video portrays an interview that Krstic gave at a checkpoint, showing 
buses moving past, although he alleged that he did not see ‘the refugee 
population or any signs of the buses transporting them.’cclxix On balance, the ICTY 
found the visual evidence much more compelling, which contributed, according 
to commentators, to Krstic’s conviction.cclxx 
From a jurisprudential perspective, the presence of international observers 
photographing and recording atrocities is desirable. These individuals range 
from military photographers to UN peacekeepers, international photojournalists 
and videographers, investigators, and forensic photographers. The gaze of ‘white 
people’ on atrocities is sometimes woven into the fabric of the unfolding events. 
This was illustrated in the Pauline Nyiramashuko case (ICTR), when a witness 
recounted that whereas provisions a ‘white man’ brought for refugees sheltered 
in Rango Forest were not distributed, after ‘“white people” came and 
photographed the refugees,’ the maize was distributed.cclxxi It appears that two or 
three individuals were ‘saved’ when ‘white journalists’ started taking 
photographs of buses transporting victims to their death at the Leon Minor 
Seminary in Rwanda in May 1994.cclxxii By contrast, the complicity of an 
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individual who acted as a translator for a group of ‘white people’ that took 
‘pictures of the refugees’ at a site in southern Rwanda in June 1994, may have 
contributed to his targeted execution the following day.cclxxiii  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In essence, patterns and trends in how international professionals witness some 
atrocities while ignoring others raises profound moral questions about how ‘we’ 
view the ‘other,’ and to evoke Butler’s terminology, which lives are grievable. In 
the legal realm, there are other forms of evidence upon which the prosecution of 
atrocity crimes may hinge, but the probative value of evidence from image 
producing technologies is irrefutable. In fact, the capacity of international 
observers to comprehend these sophisticated technologies means that their 
evidence is highly regarded by international bodies. A pattern emerges in the 
way these ‘super witnesses’ engage with jurisprudential mechanisms largely 
aligned to their own socio-cultural backgrounds; the politico-juridical bodies can 
apprehend their epistemological journey in the production and interpretation of 
the visual products. It is notable that the aforementioned evidence produced by 
the photojournalist Corinne Dufka was significant to Charles Taylor’s successful 
prosecution, but Dufka also appeared as a witness at the ICTR. Visiting Rwanda 
three times in May 1994, Dufka’s photographs showing heavily armed militia at a 
roadblock were seen to decisively corroborate the oral testimony of a witness 
who had survived the genocide.cclxxiv Similar trends in the way that the testimony 
of professional witnesses is received by international tribunals are observable 
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elsewhere,cclxxv punctuated by the rare criticism of a UN peacekeeper in Justice 
Nyambe’s separate and concurring opinion in the Tolimir judgment (ICTY).cclxxvi 
These trends may in part stem from the conventional monopoly that 
international witnesses have had on recording technologies and associated 
resources.cclxxvii However, as pointed out by Reading, the advent of digital 
technologies, such as smartphones, instant dissemination via the Internet, iCloud 
computing and storage, ushers in a new era of digital witnessing more accessible 
than the traditional model of media reportage.cclxxviii  
Drawing together the threads of discussion, the article maps out a tripartite 
structure in studying the significance of the visual as evidentiary witness to 
atrocity crimes before international courts and tribunals. Two key modalities: 
the transitive function of photography, and the probative value of visual 
evidence map a connection to ‘the real.’ Photography’s transitive function 
describes an audience’s affective reaction to images that shatter imagined 
utopias, sustained by photography’s mechanical capacity to depict ‘the real.’ Our 
affective response is not predictable, and greatly depends on the contextual 
apprehension of the image. While the transitive function of photography is 
critical for mass media (and now the main vehicle for information on social 
media streams), the capacity of photos to shock or to haunt also determines the 
journey of the visual in providing evidence of the most serious crimes in 
international law. This is because during the life stage of the image a viewer 
notices that what is depicted contravenes moral, social or legal norms.cclxxix 
Undoubtedly, there are politico-military contexts that condition individuals to be 
inured to such scenes, making it difficult for images to transcend the original 
scene. But the potentiality for a different transitive response remains all the 
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same: the photo may turn against its creator. This is because the ‘constitutive 
ambivalence of all photography ensures that no final meaning will ever prevail,’ 
although jurisprudence will construct a legal narrative of events around visual 
artefacts at a particular moment in time.cclxxx  The high probative value attached 
to visual evidence stems from its claims to mechanical reliability in relation to 
‘the real.’ Visual records provide an authoritative account of reality; proving that 
which is depicted in the image. Utilising photography to reimagine the scene was 
preferred over a site visit in the Galic trial.cclxxxi Essentially, the visual may 
present an insurmountable challenge to defence arguments, by disrupting and 
contradicting oral testimony and hearsay evidence. Tensions do sometimes arise 
between the transitive function of photography and its probative role as 
evidence, illuminated by common law rules of evidence that exclude visual 
evidence which would risk of prejudicing a jury. Having detailed the multi-
functional role of the visual field of representation in documenting the most 
serious international crimes, it is submitted that the visual field will continue to 
occupy a critical hub in the evidentiary matrix, although the nature of witnessing 
based on more advanced technologies is undoubtedly changing.  
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